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P l a vsÿic: Geneticist in the Service of a Great CrimeÕ,
Bosnia Report: Newsletter of the Alliance to Defend
B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a 19 (June-August 1997),
translated from H e l s i nsÿka povelja ( H e l s i n k i
Charter), Belgrade, November 1996.
The Ba l ka ns
M I C H A E L  S E L L S
The curse below was revived with a vengeance at the
6 0 0t h anniversary commemoration of the death of
Serb Prince Lazar at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Re-
ligious nationalists in Serbia accuse not only the Ot-
toman Turks who fought Lazar, but also the Balkan
Muslims of today of being stained with the blood of
Christ-prince Lazar.1
Whoever is a Serb of Serbian blood
Whoever shares with me this heritage,
And he comes not to fight at Kosovo,
May he never have the progeny
His heart desires, neither son nor daughter;
Beneath his hand let nothing decent grow
Neither purple grapes nor wholesome wheat;
Let him rust away like dripping iron
Until his name be extinguished.2 
Balkan Islam and
the Mythology
o f K o s o v o
In a Passion play, the actors who kill the
martyr (Jesus, for example, or Imam Hus-
sein) exit the stage quickly to avoid being
pummelled by the audience. When an excit-
ed crowd rushes the stage to beat the actor,
time is collapsed. The crowd reacts not as an
audience watching a representation of a
past event, but as if they were actually living
the original event. While stage re-enact-
ment was not an important part of the Koso-
vo pageant of 1989, a similar collapse of
time was evident. The relics of Lazar were
transported around Serbia, arriving at the
monastery nearest the battle site on the
feast day of Lazar (Vidovdan). There they
were ceremonially unveiled for the first time
in history. Slobodan Milosÿe v ic« then mount-
ed a stage on the battle site and, with a
backdrop of Kosovo symbolism and before
an excited audience of more than a million
people (some of them waving his picture
alongside images of Lazar) boasted of his
plan to revoke KosovoÕs autonomy. 
This time collapse was tied to other pow-
erful symbols: 1) the sacred space of the
ÔSerb JerusalemÕ Ð as Kosovo, with its mag-
nificent monasteries of the medieval Serb
kingdoms, is called by Serb nationalists; 2)
the historical memory of atrocities suffered
by Serbs in World War II Ð a memory height-
ened by ritual disinterment in the late 1980s
of remains of Serb victims amidst calls for
revenge and the stereotyping of all Bosni-
ans, Albanians, and Croats as genocidal; and
3) false claims by Serbian bishops and acad-
emics that Albanians in Kosovo were en-
gaged in mass rape, systematic annihilation
of Serb sacral heritage, and genocide. Reli-
gious nationalists exploited the mythology
of Kosovo throughout the Ôethnic cleans-
ingÕ. Paramilitaries wore shoulder patches
depicting the battle of Kosovo, sang songs
about the Kosovo battle, forced their cap-
tives to sing songs, and decorated them-
selves with medals named after heroes of
the Kosovo battle.
The nexus of primordial time, historical
memory, sacred space, and accusations of
present genocide Ð all brought together
around the 1989 Kosovo commemoration Ð
was inflamed further by a particularly viru-
lent form of Orientalism. In the 19t h c e n t u r y ,
Serbian nationalists made explicit the por-
trayal of Prince Lazar as a Christ-figure: a
Last Supper with twelve knight-disciples, in-
cluding one traitor, and a Mary Magdalene
figure. The most important work of 19t h c e n-
tury Serb nationalism was T h e M o u n t a i n
W r e a t h , a verse drama published in 1857 by
the Montenegrin Orthodox bishop known
as Njegosÿ. It opens with Serb bishops and
knights deciding to ÔcleanseÕ Montenegro of
non-Christians. The Vlad (Prince-Bishop)
summons the Slavic Muslims and offers
them a last chance to convert. The Muslims
reply that Orthodox and Muslims are one
people and request a ÔgodfatherÕ (K u m) cer-
emony through which blood feuds were
healed. When Serb elders reply that the cer-
emony requires baptism, the Muslims sug-
gest baptism for the Christian child and ritu-
al tonsure for the Muslim child. The inter-re-
ligious K u m ceremony is rejected and the
Muslims are driven away as ÔTurkifiersÕ and
Ôspitters on the crossÕ. The play ends with a
glorification of the Christmas extermination
of the Muslims, the annihilation of all traces
of their existence, followed by ritual com-
munion (without the confession obligatory
after all killings) for the Serb knights. In the
view of the Njegosÿ, the antagonism be-
tween Christian and Muslim is not only age-
old: it is eternal, built into the very structure
of the cosmos. The Mountain Wreath w a s
reprinted and disseminated in 1989. Later,
Serb nationalists celebrated the ÔcleansingÕ
of villages in Bosnia by posting on the Inter-
net verses from The Mountain Wreath c e l e-
brating Ôthe extermination of the TurkifiersÕ.3
This concept of ÔTurkifierÕ reflects Chris-
toslavism, the notion that a Slav who con-
verts from Christianity is transformed ethni-
cally into a Turk. Twentieth-century writers
(both Catholic and Orthodox) combined
Christoslavism with racial ideas. Conversion
was simultaneously a race-betrayal and
race-transformation that left one perpetual-
ly outside of the ÔpeopleÕ and placed one
alongside those with the blood of the
Christ-prince Lazar on their hands. Ottoman
rule was portrayed as one of unremitting
savagery in which the Ottomans Ôstole the
bloodÕ of Serbs and Serb culture and de-
stroyed the great monasteries of Kosovo.
Ironically, the latter claim is often made on
tours of the monasteries that in fact sur-
vived very well the five centuries of Ot-
toman rule.4
The monasteries also survived centuries
surrounded by Kosovar Albanians. Yet, mo-
tivated by repeated false claims that the
ÔTurksÕ (i.e. the Albanians) were destroying
the monasteries, Serbian militias destroyed
thousands of Islamic monuments in areas of
Bosnia they controlled, including major
masterworks of the 16t h century such as the
Ferhadiya in Banja Luka and the Coloured
Mosque of Focùa. In Sarajevo, the Serb army
burned the National Library (more than a
million volumes and a hundred thousand
rare books) and the Oriental Institute (with
over 5,000 manuscripts in Arabic, Persian,
Turkish, Slavic, and Aljamiado). One goal of
destroying the evidence of shared civiliza-
tion was to help establish as fact the Serbian
nationalist myth, which holds that Muslims
and Christians never were Ôone peopleÕ and
are doomed to repeat age-old antagonisms.
Tragically, Western policy makers and espe-
cially UN commanders adopted the aggres-
sor mythology of inevitable age-old hatreds
to excuse their refusal to protect the victims
of Ôethnic cleansingÕ or to allow them to de-
fend themselves. In Kosovo, Serbian reli-
gious nationalists have been equally me-
thodical in effacing identity Ð from libraries
and mosques to wedding rings and identity
c a r d s .5
Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavsÿic«, a bi-
ologist and former head of the Academy of
Natural Sciences in Sarajevo, announced in
1994 that:
[É] it was genetically deformed material
that embraced Islam. And now, of course,
with each successive generation this gene
simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse
and worse. It simply expresses itself and
dictates their style of thinking and behaving,
which is rooted in their genes.6
As shown by Plavsÿic« and her formerly sec-
ularist and communist colleagues, the effec-
tiveness of the Kosovo nexus of religious
and historical mythologies is not dependent
upon self-conscious beliefs or sincerity. For
leaders like Plavsÿic« and their followers, it
provides an alternative system of logic that
makes plausible their sudden conversions
and justifies their acts to themselves and
their audience.
A Bosnian refugee told me the following
story: When her Serb neighbours protested
against their participating in ÔcleansingÕ the
Muslims, Serb paramilitaries shot them dead
in front of their son and then forced the son
into the army. The Muslim womanÕs husband
was the K u m (godfather) of the Serb son.
Break the inter-religious K u m bond, which
presupposes that Christians and Muslims are
Ôone peopleÕ, is the currently the goal, just as
it was in The Mountain Wreath. Proposals to
validate that goal and partition the Balkans
along religious lines, placing Balkan Muslims
in economically and politically untenable
enclaves (landlocked equivalents of Gaza)
would lead to further violence or Ð if the con-
sistent history of non-Christian ghettos in
Europe since 1096 is any guide Ð to an even
worse outcome. Meanwhile, the Bosnian
Muslim family has preserved the home of
their Serb friends for the return of the son,
for whom they are now searching. 
After years of propaganda, Njegosÿ- s t y l e
mythology, and complicity in genocide, Ser-
bian society has been radicalized. SerbiaÕs
most popular politician is Vojislav Sÿesÿelj, an
open proponent of annihilation of Kosovar
Albanians, and its most popular celebrity is
the indicted war criminal Arkan. Even so,
when the radical elements in a society are
defeated, a society can turn quickly to its
better values (witness the transformation of
formerly fascist states after WWII). The inter-
national community can support the many
who still refuse the ideology of religious
apartheid or it can betray them by ratifying
Ôethnic cleansingÕ. The stakes are high, both
for the moral universe we will inhabit and
for the already delicate relations between
the Islamic world and the West. '
Burning of the
National Library
in Sarajevo by
Serb shelling in
late August 1992.
